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the implementation or change of information processing routines, known as cognitive control, is 
traditionally believed to be closely linked to consciousness. it seems that we exert control over our 
behavior if we know the reasons for, and consequences of, doing so. recent research suggests, 
however, that several behavioral phenomena that have been construed as instances of cognitive 
control can be prompted by events of which actors are not aware. here we give a brief review of 
this research, discuss possible reasons for inconsistencies in the empirical evidence, and suggest 
some lines of future research. specifically, we suggest to differentiate cognitive control evoked ei-
ther because of explicit or because of implicit control cues. while the former type of control seems 
to work outside of awareness, the latter type of control seems to be restricted to consciously regis-
tered events that call for control.
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IntroductIon
It has been known for a long time that unconscious stimuli can affect 
our behavior. Classical demonstrations of this phenomenon relate to 
neurological cases of blindsight, neglect, or extinction, where patients, 
despite being unaware of parts of their visual field, locate and identify 
stimuli above chance level (e.g., Fuentes & Humphreys, 1996; Pöppel, 
Held, & Frost, 1973; Weiskrantz, 1986, 2002; Young & de Haan, 1993). 
In healthy participants similar phenomena have been demonstrated 
by means of subliminal priming. In subliminal priming experiments, 
participants respond to a target that is preceded by another, so-called 
prime stimulus. Although the prime is heavily masked, and thus phe-
nomenally “unaware”, it leaves a trace in behavior: Responses are usu-
ally faster and more accurate when prime and target are mapped to the 
same motor response (e.g., Dehaene et al., 1998; Neumann & Klotz, 
1994; Vorberg, Mattler, Heinecke, Schmidt, & Schwarzbach, 2003) or 
belong to the same semantic category (e.g., Dell’Aqua & Grainger, 1999; 
Kiefer, 2002; Kiefer & Brendel, 2006; Martens, Ansorge, & Kiefer, 2011; 
Schütz, Schendzielarz, Zwitserlood, & Vorberg, 2007), which implies 
that the prime is processed to some degree. 
Explanations  of  vision  without  awareness  typically  assume  that 
even unconscious stimuli are processed, provided the cognitive system 
was prepared in advance to do so (e.g., Ansorge & Neumann, 2005; 
Kiesel,  2009;  Kiesel,  Kunde,  &  Hoffmann,  2007;  Kunde,  Kiesel,  & 
Hoffmann, 2003, 2005; Martens & Kiefer, 2009; Neumann & Klotz, 
1994; Pohl, Kiesel, Kunde, & Hoffmann, 2010). Thus, the effective-
ness  of  subliminal  stimuli  depends  on  preparatory  processes  that 
occur in advance of, and set the stage for, such subliminal stimuli. 
There are many different versions of this basic assumption, varying 
for example on whether actual practice with certain stimuli is neces-
sary  for  efficient  preparation  (e.g.,  Damian,  2001),  or  whether  the 
mere  intention  to  respond  to  these  stimuli  suffices  (Naccache  & 
Dehaene, 2001), or whether appropriate preparation enables semantic 
processing of subsequent unconscious stimuli (Dehaene et al., 1998) 
or  remains  confined  to  the  analysis  of  perceptual  features  (Kunde 
et al., 2003). Despite such differences, all these models share com-
mon  ground:  Stimulus  awareness  is  not  necessary  for  processing, 
given that the observer/actor is prepared to encounter these stimuli 
(e.g., Dehaene & Naccache, 2001).AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology review Article
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A reservAtIon of conscIousness: 
cognItIve control? 
The above review shows that the processing of subliminal stimuli is 
widely acknowledged. In fact, sometimes the capacity for unconscious 
processing is assumed to be even larger than the capacity for conscious 
processing (e.g., Custers & Aarts, 2010; Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, 
& van Baaren, 2006). One may therefore wonder whether there is 
anything left at all that “the unconscious” cannot do. Stated conversely, 
are there processes that can only operate on events we are aware of? 
Answering this question is important because knowing which pro-
cesses require awareness and which do not shed light on the functional 
role  of  awareness  in  human  information  processing.  Indeed,  some 
researchers claim that cognitive control processes obligatorily require 
awareness (e.g., Dehaene, & Naccache, 2001; Jack & Shallice, 2001; for 
an overview, see Hommel, 2007). The term cognitive control is widely 
used in modern psychology and describes phenomena that have been 
considered in chapters on “will” in historical textbooks of psychology 
(e.g., Ach, 1905). Although not very well defined, it seems fair to say 
that cognitive control denotes those processes that configure the cogni-
tive system to process stimuli in a specific manner, and re-configure 
the cognitive system when certain events tell the observer/actor to treat 
stimuli in a different way.
There are many different situations or experimental effects that are 
assumed to include such control operations. For example, in studies on 
task switching, participants have to respond to the same stimuli in a 
different way depending on the currently instructed task context, and 
thus cognitive control is believed to be heavily involved in task switch-
ing (Kiesel et al., 2010; Monsell, 2003). Likewise, in stop-signal tasks, 
a sudden stimulus tells the actor to inhibit the response to a stimulus 
(Logan, 1982). Here the assumption is that the “cognitive veto” (to not 
carry out the response that would otherwise occur) is an instance of 
cognitive control. Another proposed instance of cognitive control is 
the adaptation to conflicting response tendencies that are based on 
automatic processing of irrelevant information. Such conflicting ten-
dencies are a hallmark of so-called interference tasks, such as the Simon 
task (Simon, 1969), the Eriksen task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974), or the 
Stroop task (Stroop, 1935). In these tasks, a nominally task-irrelevant 
stimulus or stimulus feature suggests a different response than is actu-
ally required. The crucial observation is that when response-conflict 
is generally frequent (e.g., in a block of trials), or has just been expe- 
rienced (e.g., in the preceding trial), the information processing is 
altered in subsequent trials, such that, for example, more attention is 
devoted to task-relevant rather than to task-irrelevant stimulus aspects. 
As a consequence of this control impact, the influence of irrelevant 
information  with  frequent  or  recent  response  conflict  is  reduced 
(Botvinick,  Braver,  Barch,  Carter,  &  Cohen,  2001;  Gratton,  Coles, 
& Donchin, 1992; Kiesel, Kunde, & Hoffmann, 2006; Kunde, 2003; 
Kunde & Wühr, 2006), and responses generally slow down (Kiesel et 
al., 2006; Verguts, Notebaert, Kunde, & Wühr, 2011).
Regarding the interplay of consciousness and cognitive control, it 
is important to note that we are normally aware of the events that call 
for a modification of our routine actions. These may be external events 
such as changes in the environment, warning signals, the occurrence 
of errors, or internal events such as experienced effort in selecting ap-
propriate behavior or some kind of self-instruction (Goschke, 2000). 
Intuitively, there is a strong link between awareness and the recruit-
ment of cognitive control. Also, in psychological theorizing, cognitive 
control processes are strongly related to consciousness, in the sense 
that these processes rely on conscious decision-making (Dehaene & 
Naccache, 2001; Jack & Shallice, 2001; Umilta, 1988; for an overview, 
see Hommel, 2007). For example, Jack and Shallice (2001) emphasize 
that the underlying processes engaged by conscious action are differ-
ent from those engaged by automatic action. Similarly, Dehaene and 
Naccache (2001) suggest in their workspace model that routine actions 
are possible without consciousness, while consciousness is required 
for cognitive control. They state that “it should be impossible for an 
unconscious stimulus to modify processing on a trial-by-trial basis 
through top-down control“ (Dehaene & Naccache, 2001, p. 21) and 
that “an unseen prime cannot be used as a source of control to modify 
the choice of processing steps“ (Naccache, Blandin, & Dehaene, 2002, 
p. 423). 
Although such a control-consciousness link appears persuasive, it 
is a matter of empirical research to determine whether it holds true. 
First of all, it is important to scrutinize the problem under investiga-
tion. The questions are not whether observers/actors become aware 
that events exert cognitive control and how this happens. The answers 
to those questions are likely negative. Normally, we barely notice that 
we do something like “focusing attention” or “activating a task set”. We 
conjecture that cognitive control does not require meta-knowledge of 
when and how to apply it. Instead, we believe that the important and 
empirically testable question is whether changes of behavior through 
cognitive control occur when the control-invoking event remains un-
noticed.
We will review a substantial number of studies that pursued this 
research  strategy.  To  anticipate  a  main  result,  the  outcome  of  this 
research program is ambiguous. Some studies suggest that cognitive 
control can be prompted by events that remain unnoticed, whereas 
other studies suggest that they cannot. This apparent discrepancy calls 
for clarification. A first step towards such clarification is to sort the evi-
dence into cases where unconscious invoking of control is consistently 
found and those where it is not. One possible categorization concerns 
the types of events that call for control. These events vary enormously 
regarding complexity, duration, ambiguity, and so forth. We found it 
most favorable to arrange the presentation of studies according to a 
distinction in two types of control-invoking events, namely explicit 
and implicit events. 
Explicit  events  consist  of  one  distinct  stimulus  that  directly  in-
forms the observer what is requested from him or her. This applies, 
for example, to a stop signal. In stop-signal tasks, an explicit stop 
signal  instructs  to  withhold  an  already  selected  motor  response 
(Logan, 1982). Likewise, in an explicit task cuing procedure, a task 
cue instructs the actor which stimulus-response mapping to apply, 
and which aspect of the stimulus to attend to in the next trial (Meiran, AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology review Article
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1996). Thus, a stop signal is linked to the termination of response 
execution and a task cue requires the recollection of a certain task   
set.
In contrast, implicit events encompass more than one single, ex-
plicit stimulus and they have to be derived from the task environment. 
This applies, for instance, to frequency manipulations across a block of 
trials, such as a manipulation of the frequency of conflict-laden trials in 
an experimental block of a Stroop task (e.g., Logan & Zbrodoff, 1979). 
The control-invoking event in this case (the proportion of incongruent 
trials) is an abstract property of several preceding episodes which are 
spread in time. Moreover, the appropriate consequence of encountering 
such an event, such as “focusing on task-relevant stimuli,” is less clearly 
defined than in the explicit case. The explicit-implicit distinction is an 
empirical one, but it may relate to functional differences as well, which 
we will discuss later. In the following, we first discuss control invoked 
by explicit events, since the situation is relatively undisputed in this 
case. 
cognItIve control  
Invoked by explIcIt events
To  our  knowledge,  there  are  three  instances  of  cognitive  control 
that  have  been  tested  to  be  subliminally  induced  by  explicit  cues. 
These  are  task  preparation,  response  inhibition,  and  orienting   
of attention.
Task preparation
Several studies investigated whether masked primes have the power to 
activate task sets. Mattler (2003, 2005, 2006, 2007) used a task switch-
ing paradigm in which a cue preceded an imperative stimulus. The 
cue informed the participants as to which task should be performed 
on a subsequent stimulus. For example, the cue informed whether the 
pitch or the timbre of a tone should be judged. In Mattler’s studies, 
the task cues were preceded by a masked, and hence invisible, prime. 
Importantly, in trials in which the prime resembled the task cue, per-
formance was facilitated, suggesting that the prime prompted the pre-
paration of the corresponding task. Alternative explanations, such that 
the prime merely facilitates the perceptual encoding of the subsequent 
task cue rather than activating the task set, were ruled out by using se-
veral perceptually dissimilar cue exemplars (Mattler, 2006). Later, Lau 
and Passingham (2007) observed that the masked primes also activate 
brain areas that are known to be involved in performing the respec-
tive tasks. Reuss, Kiesel, Kunde, and Hommel (2011) complemented 
these findings by showing that not only is the switching towards a 
cued task facilitated by masked primes, but also that masked primes 
determine which task participants prefer to carry out. Participants 
in that study were shown task cues that told them which of two tasks 
(e.g., judging parity or magnitude of a digit) they should perform 
on a later presented target stimulus, or cues that told them whether 
to repeat the current task or switch to the other one. Sometimes the 
cue was masked and thus participants had the free choice to carry 
out whichever task they wanted. In these situations, the subliminally 
cued task or the subliminally cued task repetition/alternation was pre-
ferred. Thus, a masked stimulus does not only facilitate task prepara-
tion, but it may also trigger which task is eventually selected. In sum, 
there is little doubt that masked stimuli have the power to induce task   
sets. 
Response inhibition
Another, perhaps even more basic, cognitive control process is the 
inhibition of motor output. Such inhibition is particularly challenging 
when a motor action is already prepared and is about to be executed. 
These conditions are fulfilled in stop signal experiments (Logan, 1982). 
In  such  experiments,  participants  carry  out  speeded  responses  to 
certain stimuli. In some occasions a stop signal is presented after the 
imperative stimulus that asks the participants to withhold the already 
prepared response. The assumption is that in such cases inhibitory 
control, that is a cognitive veto, is needed to shut down motor output. 
This task was used by van Gaal, Ridderinkhof, van den Wildenberg, 
and Lamme (2009). The innovative modification in their experiment 
was that the stop signal was sometimes masked so that participants had 
no clue that it had been presented. Even after an invisible stop signal re-
sponses were sometimes fully inhibited, and responses were delayed in 
cases where they were not inhibited. The authors therefore concluded 
that a masked stimulus can invoke inhibitory control processes. In an-
other study, van Gaal, Lamme, and Ridderinkhof (2010) reported that 
the efficiency to inhibit responses after masked stop signals correlates 
with the amplitude of the N2 of the brain activity that was time-locked 
to the stop signal. It is possible that this brain potential signals the 
start of the inhibition process. Similar inhibition effects were reported 
for Go/Nogo tasks (Hughes, Velmans, & De Fockert, 2009; van Gaal, 
Ridderinkhof, Fahrenfort, Scholte, & Lamme, 2008). Here, participants 
have to respond to a certain Go-stimulus, and they must refrain from 
responding in trials in which a Nogo stimulus appears. Response time 
is delayed when a Go stimulus is preceded by a masked version of a 
Nogo stimulus rather than by another neural stimulus, which suggests 
that the subliminal Nogo event triggers to some extend response in-
hibition. 
Interestingly, van Gaal et al. (2009) observed that another instance 
of cognitive control, post-error slowing, did not occur. In stop signal 
tasks, responding in Go trials is slowed down if the participant failed 
to inhibit a response in the previous trial (e.g., Rieger & Gauggel, 
1999). In the study of van Gaal et al., this post-error slowing effect 
occurred after failures to inhibit responses when a visible stop signal 
was presented, yet it did not occur when the stop signal was masked. 
In the same experiment, one type of control (the inhibition of re-
sponses) did occur without awareness of the control-invoking event 
(the  stop  signal),  whereas  another  instance  of  control  (post-error 
slowing) did not occur without awareness of the invoking event (an 
erroneous  response).  The  authors  conclude  that  their  results  “con-
verge with studies showing that awareness seems crucial for some 
types  of  (trial-by-trial)  cognitive  control  regulations  …  but  also 
demonstrate  the  possibility  of  unconsciously  triggered  inhibitory   
control” (p. 1136). AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology review Article
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Orienting of attention
While response inhibition can be described as cognitive control at the 
output side, there is also cognitive control at the input side, namely in 
the selection of stimuli. For example, humans can deliberately attend to 
stimuli in one modality, such as vision or audition. Mattler (2003) cued 
participants as to whether they should respond to stimuli in either the 
visual or auditory modality while presenting different stimuli in both 
modalities simultaneously. The modality cue was preceded by a masked 
prime that was perceptually similar either to the cue for the visual or to 
the auditory modality, meaning the masked prime and the cue could 
either signal the same modality or different modalities. Performance 
was superior if the prime signaled the modality that participants were 
required to attend to, according to the subsequent cue. This led Mattler 
to conclude that the subliminal prime already produced an orienting of 
attention to the corresponding sensory modality. 
Within the visual modality humans can orient attention covertly 
to different locations of their visual fields even without moving their 
eyes. This can happen due to a sudden change in the environment that 
automatically draws attention to that location (Jonides & Yantis, 1988), 
or because a certain symbolic cue predicts where in the visual field a 
relevant target is to be expected (Posner, 1980). A number of studies 
demonstrated that unconsciously presented exogenous cues induce 
covert shifts of attention concerning this first type of attention orient-
ing, the exogenously driven attention (e.g., Ansorge & Heumann, 2006; 
Ansorge & Neumann, 2005; Ivanoff & Klein, 2003; Lambert, Naikar, 
McLachlan, & Aitken, 1999; McCormick, 1997; Mulckhuyse, Talsma, 
& Theeuwes, 2007; Scharlau, 2002; Scharlau & Ansorge, 2003; Scharlau 
& Neumann, 2003; for a review, see Mulckhuyse & Theeuwes, 2010). 
Regarding the consciousness-control issue, the second type of atten-
tion orienting that is proposed to occur in an endogenously control-
led manner is particularly interesting. Reuss, Pohl, Kiesel, and Kunde 
(2011) found that masked arrow cues did in fact facilitate the process-
ing of targets in the cued location. But they did so only when masked 
cues occurred in a context of visible cues that were predictive for the 
target location. The authors concluded that it is only when observers 
have the intention to use the cues that masked versions of such cues 
prompt shifts of attention.
To summarize, in the studies reviewed thus far the need for cogni-
tive control is conveyed by a distinct stimulus. Moreover, participants 
had practice with visible versions of these stimuli. If such conditions 
are met, subliminal exemplars of these stimuli produce behavioral ef-
fects that can be considered as instances of cognitive control. 
cognItIve control  
Invoked by ImplIcIt events
Conflict frequency
The need for control is sometimes not explicitly signaled, but is merely 
implicitly  suggested,  by  the  environment.  One  intensively  studied 
control phenomenon of this type is the adaptation to conflict (Egner, 
2008). As already briefly explained, conflict typically occurs in so-called 
interference tasks. Interference effects show that the human observer 
cannot be entirely shielded against processing irrelevant information. 
However,  the  extent  to  which  irrelevant  information  is  processed 
depends on the experienced utility of that information. For example, 
when  response  conflict  occurs  frequently  in  an  experiment,  inter- 
ference effects decline, suggesting that the processing of irrelevant input 
is reduced (e.g., Funes, Lupiáñez, & Humphreys, 2010). In fact, when 
the irrelevant information more often suggests the incorrect rather than 
the correct response, interference effects can even reverse (i.e., faster 
responding in incongruent rather than congruent trials). Apparently, 
observers then use the irrelevant information to strategically prepare 
a response that is not suggested by irrelevant information but which 
will probably be correct (Logan & Zbrodoff, 1979). Importantly, such 
strategic adaptation to conflict frequency occurs only when the irre- 
levant information is consciously perceived (e.g., Cheesman & Merikle, 
1985; Merikle & Joordens, 1997; Merikle, Joordens, & Stolz, 1995). For 
example, Merikle and Joordens (1997) presented primes in a variant of 
the Stroop task for a longer or shorter duration so that the primes were 
either clearly visible or essentially invisible. The participants adapted to 
conflict frequency and responded faster on incongruent trials than on 
congruent trials. However, this occurred only when the primes were 
presented for the long duration and were thus visible. When the primes 
were presented for a shorter duration, and were thus invisible, the 
regular Stroop effect was observed with faster responding in congruent 
rather than incongruent trials. 
The manipulation of prime visibility by manipulation of prime 
duration was not optimal, since this also changed the stimulus-onset 
asynchrony (SOA) between prime and target, which in itself can re-
sult in reversed congruency effects (Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998). 
However, predictive unconscious invalid primes have also turned out 
to be inefficient with constant timing parameters (Ansorge, Heumann, 
& Scharlau, 2002, Experiment 3). 
These observations suggest that strategic changes of information 
processing do not occur in adaption to manipulations of conflict fre-
quency of which the actor is not aware. Related observations have also 
been made regarding the manipulation of perceptual format of stimuli. 
While observers adapt to frequency manipulations of the perceptual 
format of visible targets (specifically, whether numerical stimuli are 
presented as digits or number words), no such adaptation occurs when 
format frequency is manipulated in invisible primes (Van den Bussche, 
Segers, & Reynvoet, 2008). 
Nonetheless,  the  evidence  regarding  adaptation  to  conflict  fre-
quency is not unequivocal. Jaśkowski, Skalska, and Verleger (2003, 
Experiment 2) found that masked priming effects declined from a 
condition with 80% congruent trials to a condition with 20% congru-
ent trials. However, the authors consider this effect to not be a direct 
consequence of conflict frequency. Rather, they propose that “effects 
of subliminal priming are under observers’ strategic control, with the 
criterion presumably set as a function of the openly observable error 
frequency” (p. 911). In other words, the adaptation to (unconscious) 
conflict frequency is considered to be mediated by adaptation to (con-AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology review Article
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scious) error rates. Adaptation to error frequency might also explain 
congruency proportion effects with masked primes in a study by Klapp 
(2007, Experiment 3). 
A related explanation applies to a series of studies by Bodner and 
colleagues where congruency proportions have been found to shape 
congruency  effects  in  masked  priming  (Bodner  &  Dypvik,  2005;   
Bodner & Masson, 2001, 2003; Bodner, & Mulji, 2010). In some ex-
periments objective measures of prime visibility were missing (Bodner 
& Masson, 2001), or they revealed above-chance prime-discrimination 
performance (Boder & Dypvik, 2005) which makes it hard to judge the 
role of prime awareness for the observed effects. Even if we set the no-
torious problem of prime visibility aside, alternative explanations have 
been proposed that do not interpret this effect to be a direct adaptation 
to unconscious conflict frequency. The ASE (adaptation to the statistics 
of the environment) model proposed by Kinoshita, Mozer, and Foster 
(2008)  explains  these  effects  as  adaptation  to  trial  difficulty  rather 
than to prime usefulness. Blocks with many incongruent primes are 
more difficult than primes with many congruent primes. Participants 
may notice subtle difficulty differences and then adapt to them (for a 
more detailed explanation along these lines, see Van den Bussche & 
Reynvoet, 2008). 
Context-specific conflict frequency
Recently, another instance of cognitive control has been proposed, 
namely adaptations to context-specific variations of conflict frequency. 
The crucial observation is that congruency effects decline in perceptual 
contexts in which interference is high (high proportion of incongru-
ent trials), and increase in contexts in which interference is low (low 
proportion of incongruent trials, Corballis & Gratton, 2003; Crump, 
Gong, & Milliken, 2006; Lehle & Hübner, 2008; Vietze & Wendt, 2009). 
The context is normally a task-irrelevant feature, such as the presenta-
tion location, that varies unpredictably from trial to trial, and that is 
presented only briefly before or simultaneously with the imperative 
stimuli. Adaptations to context-specific conflict frequency are striking 
because they suggest a very high flexibility and speed of cognitive con-
trol operations that affect response. The question again is whether such 
context-specific adaptation effects occur even when response conflicts 
are induced by subliminal primes, so that no representations of con-
text-specific conflict frequencies can evolve. To study this, Heinemann, 
Kunde, and Kiesel (2009) used a subliminal priming task. Participants 
had to categorize a target number as being smaller or larger than 5. The 
target was preceded by a prime number that was also smaller or larger 
than 5. In Experiment 1, these primes were masked rather weakly (vi-
sible primes). Each trial started with the presentation of a fixation cross 
surrounded by a colored rectangle. The color of this rectangle was the 
context. For one color, trials were mostly (80%) congruent (low-inter-
ference context), whereas with the other color trials were mostly (80%) 
incongruent (high-interference context). With visible primes, partici-
pants adapted to the context-specific conflict proportion. The congru-
ency effect amounted to 54 ms in the low-interference context, and to 
32 ms in the high-interference context. Because the size of the congru-
ency effect is a measure for the influence of interfering information, the 
context-specific congruency effect shows that context information was 
used to inhibit prime processing in the high-interference context or, 
alternatively, to facilitate prime processing in the low-interference con-
text. With subliminal primes (Experiment 2) participants showed an 
overall congruency effect of similar size as with supraliminal primes. 
Importantly in contrast to the results of Experiment 1, this congruency 
effect was not affected by context information.
This  finding  qualifies  observations  by  Crump  and  colleagues 
(Crump et al., 2006; Crump, Vaquero, & Milliken, 2008). Crump et al. 
showed that global knowledge about the frequency of congruent and 
incongruent events in different contexts is no pre-requisite for context-
specific proportion congruency effects (CSPC effects). The amount of 
explicit knowledge of such congruency imbalances did not correlate 
with CSPC effects, nor did such knowledge boost CSPC effects. Thus, 
the learning processes that bring about CSPC effects require sufficient-
ly strong (i.e., conscious) codes of prime, target, and context but they 
need not end in, or depend on, explicit knowledge of context-specific 
congruency proportions.
Conflict recency 
Another currently intensively studied trace of cognitive control is ad-
aptation to recently experienced response conflict. The typical finding, 
sometimes called the Gratton effect (Gratton et al., 1992), is a reduc-
tion of congruency effects in trials that directly follow an incongruent 
(conflict-laden) trial in interference tasks. The phenomenon as such 
has been replicated many times for various interference tasks (see 
e.g., Egner, 2008, for a recent review). The common explanation is 
that experiencing conflict helps to overcome later conflict by invoking 
control mechanisms that amplify the processing of relevant informa-
tion (Egner & Hirsch, 2005) or attenuate the processing of irrelevant 
information (e.g., Botvinick et al., 2001).
The important question in the present context is: Do such conflict 
adaptation effects occur, even when participants are not aware of a 
conflict in the preceding trial? A paradigm that is suited for studying 
this question is, again, the masked priming paradigm, because the 
potentially interfering information (i.e., the prime) can be masked ef-
ficiently. Over the last 15 years there have been several investigations 
of this issue. The first study was reported by Greenwald, Abrams, and 
Draine  (1996).  These  authors  found  a  conflict  adaptation  effect  in 
conditions with clearly visible primes, but no such effect with masked 
primes. This finding was replicated by Kunde (2003). That study con-
tained an experiment with prime visibility manipulated trial-by-trial. 
Interestingly, the conflict adaptation effect did not occur when the 
just-preceding trial contained an invisible prime. It did occur, however, 
when the just-preceding trial contained a visible prime, even when 
the prime in the current trial was invisible. This observation implies 
that prime visibility is necessary to invoke cognitive control, whereas 
the control processes that alter information processing can operate on 
masked stimuli as well. A problem of both the study by Greenwald et 
al. (1996) and of Kunde (2003) is that prime visibility was manipulated 
by variation of prime presentation duration, whereby possibly not only 
prime visibility, but also conflict size, varied. However, in a recent study AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology review Article
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by Frings and Wentura (2008) the data pattern was replicated despite 
identical prime target intervals and, importantly, almost identical basic 
interference effects for visible and invisible primes. Another replica-
tion was provided by Ansorge, Fuchs, Khalid, and Kunde (2011). In 
that study, participants were asked after each individual trial, whether 
they believed that the preceding trial contained an incongruent prime 
or not. Conflict adaptation occurred when the prime in the preced-
ing trial was clearly perceptible. When the prime in the preceding trial 
was not perceptible, no conflict adaptation occurred, even if partici-
pants accidentally judged the (in)congruency of that prime correctly. 
Apparently, only the actual experience, not the mere conjecture of 
conflicting information, prompts conflict adaptation. 
Again, the evidence is ambiguous. Van Gaal et al. (2010) reported a 
Gratton effect even when primes were heavily masked. The procedure 
was almost identical to that of the study by Kunde (2003), except for 
the omission of a brief warning signal at the beginning of each trial and 
slightly longer trial durations. At present it is not clear whether these 
apparently minor procedural differences were really crucial. However, 
if they were, this might point to a role of some kind of memory of the 
previous trial. Possibly, such memories are weaker with a masked ra-
ther than unmasked prime, and more strongly affected by an interfer-
ing warning signal and increased trial durations.
dIscussIon
What can we learn from this review of studies on the consciousness-
control link?
Explicit and implicit events
The distinction between explicit and implicit control-invoking events 
we suggest here is an empirical one. However, this distinction reveals 
a relatively clear pattern. If the need for control is conveyed by an ex-
plicit event, awareness of that event is dispensable. However, if an event 
such as recent or frequent response conflict merely implicitly suggests 
the need of cognitive control, awareness of this event seems essential, 
or at least, evidence for the induction of control phenomena without 
awareness is not consistently found. At present we see two plausible 
explanations. 
First, the implicit events we considered here (conflict that occurred 
recently,  frequently,  or  context-specifically)  conceivably  all  require 
some sort of memory. For example, for a previous incongruent trial 
to affect processing in a subsequent trial, some trace of that previous 
trial is necessary. Only conscious event representations might be strong 
enough to bridge longer time intervals. This is even more important 
when it comes to adapting to statistic manipulations such as conflict 
frequency  and  context-specific  variations  of  conflict  frequency.  In 
these cases information of several such events has to be accumulated 
over a long period of time, and over a certain number of such events to 
extract, for example, the proportion of incongruent trials. In contrast, 
the typical time course with explicit control invoking events demands 
no accumulation of knowledge. Here, the time interval between the 
occurrence of a certain instruction stimulus (e.g., a task cue or a stop-
signal), and the point in time when the impact of cognitive control 
becomes apparent (mostly by responses to a certain stimulus) is barely 
longer than a few hundred milliseconds, and accumulation of know-
ledge over several explicit events is not necessary. 
Second, as noted in the Introduction, it is a prominent idea of se-
veral theories of action control to assume that stimuli instantaneously 
and unconsciously affect behavior only when specific if-then-plans   
exist (Bargh, 1989; Gollwitzer, 1999; Hommel, 2000; Kunde et al., 2003; 
Neumann & Klotz, 1994). This idea has fared pretty well when it comes 
to explaining the activation of relatively simple behaviors (keypressing, 
in most cases). However, it is not far-fetched to construe a cognitive 
control process as a kind of “response” of the cognitive system to cer-
tain stimuli, namely the control-invoking events we considered here. 
For example, the control process to inhibit a response or to implement 
a task set according to an explicit cue might be specified as the plan 
“if stimulus/cue X, then inhibit each response / activate task set Y”. It 
is known that if-then plans fail when either the “if”-side, that is the 
description of crucial events, or the “then”-side, that is the description 
of what to do, are not sufficiently specific (Gollwitzer, 1999). With ex-
plicit events participants have ample opportunity to shape their if-then 
plans. Participants see the stimuli and they are told what to do, and 
can even practice these plans before they encounter masked versions 
of the stimuli. The conditions are less favorable with implicit events. 
The  “if“-part  of  such  plans  are  defined  rather  vaguely:  “Response 
conflict”, for instance, is something we have no sensory organ for, but 
we have to realize that there is conflicting information that suggests 
different response alternatives. The “then”-part of the plans, the “what 
to do”-part, is also not very clear. What might be appropriate means 
to adapt to response conflict? It seems that, for example, adaptation 
to response conflict requires a specification or correction of if-then 
plans, and perhaps it is exactly this alteration of plans that requires   
awareness. 
Lines of future research 
What is important for future research on the control-consciousness 
link? First, we think it is worthwhile to further corroborate the pro-
posed separation of explicit and implicit control-invoking events. If we 
take as a conclusion of this review that control effects following explicit 
events are consistently observed, while control effects following im-
plicit events are not, two questions arise: 
1. What are the limits of explicitly prompted control, and what are 
the necessary preconditions of implicitly prompted control? 
The first question relates to the sorts of cognitive control effects that 
may be subliminally activated. Task switching, response inhibition, 
and orienting of visual attention have already been tested, but there are 
many other behavioral instances of cognitive control. For example, hu-
mans can control whether to respond quickly but rather inaccurately, or 
slowly but accurately (Rinkenauer, Osman, Ulrich, Müller-Gethmann, 
& Mattes, 2004). Can such shifts along the speed-accuracy function be 
prompted subliminally by explicit cues? Likewise, participants in dual 
task situations can give priority to one or the other task (Pashler, 1984). 
Can such task prioritization be cued subliminally? AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology review Article
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2. The second question relates to the reasons why unconscious events 
sometimes fail to prompt control, specifically when these prompts sug-
gest the need of control implicitly. It is possible that there are conditions 
that prevented the discovery of implicit control, although it is possible 
in principle. For example, there might be adaptation to unconsciously 
induced response conflict, but sometimes the subliminally induced 
conflict was too small. There might also be adaptation to previous er-
rors (post-error slowing), but perhaps in those cases where adaptation 
to unconscious errors was not found (e.g., van Gaal et al., 2009) errors 
were not sufficiently relevant for the participants. Finally, there might 
be an adaptation to unconsciously presented imbalances of conflict 
frequencies. However, these imbalances must be larger than those that 
are experienced consciously, or participants must be exposed to them 
much longer than to consciously perceived frequency imbalances. 
Finally, we must be aware of the methodical problems that research 
on awareness faces from the beginning. First, effects of unconscious 
stimuli are often small. Therefore, studies aiming to show such ef-
fects must have sufficient power to do so. Second, research on the 
consciousness-control link is perhaps particularly susceptible to publi-
cation bias. Positive evidence for control without awareness is exciting 
and may make it easier to be published in prestigious journals (or to 
be published at all), while negative evidence resides in less prestigious 
journals (or may not be published). To justify such an intuition, of 
course, meta-analytical tools are needed (cf. Van den Bussche, Van 
den Noortgaate, & Reynvoet, 2009). Third, we must remain cautious 
regarding “indirect” consciousness-mediated explanations of appar-
ently unconscious control effects. Masked events as such may remain 
unconscious, but their side-effects in behavior become apparent by 
self-observation. For example, the proportion of incongruent masked 
primes may remain undetected, but the resulting increase of error rates 
may be noticed and may prompt a corresponding adjustment indirectly 
(cf. Jaśkowski et al., 2003). 
These problems are certainly not intractable, and they should defi-
nitely not prevent us from studying the important issue of the role of 
consciousness for cognitive control. 
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